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THE NEW KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE OF OCTOBER 3, 1953.
AN ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGIES EMBEDDED IN IT
PAUL KICHYUN RYU
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1950-1952 he was Acting Dean of the Law School in Seoul National University. He re-
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EDrOR.
I. A. BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE CODE
Throughout her long history, dating back to the time of her mythical foundation
in 2333 B.C., until 1905, Korea had no criminal code in a modern sense. Although the
Hyung-Pub-Tai-Chun of 1905 was enacted with a view to a modernization of criminal
law, this code, initiated by the Japanese, in fact combined two patterns: the older
traditional laws based upon the Chinese Code and the "old Japanese Criminal Code
of 1882,"' the latter being the work of Boissonade, a distinguished French jurist
employed by the Japanese Government. ' In 1913, three years after Korea's annexa-
tion by Japan, the Japanese Governor-General imposed upon the Korean people
the Japanese Criminal Code of 1908. That code was patterned after the German
Code of 1871. After their liberation from Japanese oppression, the Korean people,
striving for spiritual as well as political independence, have strongly opposed the
continued use of the Japanese code. The present code was thus improvised to meet
the popular demand for repeal of Japanese legislation, notwithstanding warnings
from academic circles against premature legislation. The new code-the first auton-
omous modem Korean Criminal Code-came into force on October 3, 1953, super-
seding the code imposed by Japan which had been in force in Korea for 40 years.
The present article purports to present the leading ideas of the new code of 1953,
as they emerged under the impact of the several competing tendencies of the Chinese
classical idea, of Anglo-American and of German criminal law.
The code consists of two parts. Part I contains the general provisions, Part II the
specific provisions. The former deals with the general principles to be applied to the
latter, and comprises four chapters. Chapter 1, discussing the scope of the application
I The socalled "old Japanese Code", patterned after the Code Napolean of 1811, became effective
on January 1, 1882. It was later superseded by the Code of 1908 which is now in force.
2 It was Korea's tragedy that political factionalism and corruption during the latter part of the
Lee Dynasty made it impossible to'carry out a law reform in accordance with the patterns of Western
civilization from within. The modernization of Korean law was initiated by Japan. In accordance
with suggestions of Japanese advisers, the Korean Government abolished the feudal principle of
joint responsibility in 1894 and enacted a new code, the so-called Hyun-Pub-Tai-Chun in 1905. Cf.
McCUNE, KOREA TODAY (1950) 14-16. Also HuLBERT, PASSING OF KOREA (1906) 367-368.
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of the criminal code, extends the territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction to of-
fenses against Korea's interests committed by aliens outside of her territory,3 and thus
raises problems belonging to the area of international criminal law.4 Chapter 2, on
Crimes, deals with general principles concerning elements of crime. 5 Chapter 3,
regarding Punishment, is divided into several topics: (1) Death penalty; (2) Penal
servitude; (3) Imprisonment; (4) Deprivation of qualifications; (5) Suspension of
qualifications; (6) Fine; (7) Detention; (8) Minor fine; (9) Confiscation. Among these,
deprivation and suspension of qualifications are newly created types of punishment.
Another innovation has been the code's introduction of provisions concerning the
extinction of punishment.' Finally, under Anglo-American influence, the code has
received provisions for the suspension of a sentence.7 Chapter 4 deals with the com-
putation of terms of imprisonment and related matters.
Part II consists of 42 chapters and 286 articles. It divides the interests protected
against the criminal into three kinds. The first among these are State interests
(Chapters 1-11). Significantly, the code lists under this heading the crime of false
accusation, conventionally deemed a crime against the person.8 This classification
implies that consent of the victim is not regarded as a defense against the charge of
that crime.9 New provisions listed under this heading concern crimes against the
national flag (Chapter 3), ° non-performance of a munitions contract in War-time
(Article 103), non-fulfilment in war-time of a contract with the government for the
supply of necessities of life (Article 117), organization of criminal groups (Article
114), impersonation of a public official (Article 118), abandonment of official duties
(Article 122), premature publication by dn official in charge of an investigation of
facts of suspected crime (Article 126), obstruction of suffrage by a public official
3 Art. 5 of the Korean Code provides:
This Code shall apply to aliens who commit, outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,
any of the following crimes: 1. Crimes of Insurrection; 2. Crimes of Foreign Aggression; 3. Crimes
concerning the National Flag; 4. Crimes concerning Currency; 4. Crimes concerning Valuable
Securities, Postage and Revenue Stamps; 6. Crimes, specified in Articles 225 to 230 inclusive,
concerning Documents; 7. Crimes, specified in Article 238, concerning Seals.
Art. 6 of the Korean Code provides:
This code shall apply to aliens who commit, outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,
against the Republic of Korea or her nationals, crimes other than those specified in the preceding
.rticle, except where they do not constitute crimes at the place of commission or where their
prosecution or execution of the punishment imposed has been there remitted.
4 See W. BERGE, CrMnNAr. JURISDICTION AND THE TERRITORIAl PRINetPI'.. 30 Mica. L. Rxv.
238 (1932).
5 See infra, Section 11.
6 Article 81, 82, Korean Code.
7 Article 59 to 61, Korean Code.
I The French Penal Code deals with the crime of false accusation (Art. 373) within the framework
of Title II, Major and Minor Crimes against Individuals, Chapter I, Major and Minor Crimes
against Persons, §2 of Section VII, under the heading, "Calomnies, injures, rnvelation de secrets."
But the Korean Code followed the German classification of that crime. See Section 164, German
Penal Code.
9 See Japanese Supreme Court Law Reports, decision of December 20, 1911, 18 Kei-Ji-Han-
Ketsu-Shu 1566. Japanese decisions are regarded in Korea not as binding but as persuasive authority.
10 Articles 105, 106, Korean Code.
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(Article 128), obstruction by a police officer of the public prosecutor's function of
protecting human rights (Article 139)," and the crime of contempt of court, received
from the Anglo-American law.12 The second kind of protected interests are social
interests (Chapters 12-23). In the group of crimes falling under this heading there
are no innovations, except amendment of the rule on adultery and minor changes in
punishment.1 The third kind of interests protected by the criminal code are interests
of individuals; they are dealt with in provisions on crimes against persons (Chapters
24-42). In this group the following new provisions are worth noting: on pandering
(Art. 242); infanticide (Art. 251); abandoning a baby (Art. 272); cruelty to a person
who is under the accused's supervision and to lineal ascendants (Art. 273); delivery of
a child under the accused's supervision for employment at hard labor (Art. 274);
sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage (Art. 304); unjustifiable acquisition of
profit by taking advantage of another person's state of necessity (Art. 349); receiving
stolen property by gross negligence or negligence in the conduct of a trade (Art. 364);
trespass upon a boundary (Art. 370).
While the Korean Code has been influenced mainly by American and German lcgal
ideas, certain notions of that code are traceable to Chinese cultural patterns, which
were introduced into Korea particularly during the Lee Dynasty (1392 A.D.-1910
A.D.). Before discussing the American and German roots of Korean law, it is neces-
sary to note briefly its Chinese elements. Chinese classical ideas, expressed in the
teachings of Confucius and Mencius, may be summarized in two propositions. The
first is that human beings are born good, so that an ideal society is one governed by
an irreducible minumum of legal provisions. 4 The second is recognition of a division
of society into the common man and the noble man, leading to the rule of the former
by the latter, and the consequent view that ordinary people "may be made to follow
a path of action, but... may not be made to understand it." 5 These two elements
resulted in a separation of the people from the law and establishment of a hierarchy
of the people in accordance with their relative importance. It is these elements which
explain the failure in Korea of the institution of trial by jury, introduced by Japanese
law, the fact that the function of law as a means of social control has been more
limited in Korea than in the Western countries,"6 and the special status accorded in
the Korean Code to government officials and to public propefty.17 Thus, where a
government official commits a crime, his punishment is more severe than that imposed
" Articles 103, 114, 117, 118, 122, 126, 128, 138, 139, Korean Code.
2The provisions concerning that crime bear all the marks of their Anglo-American origin.
13 Under the old Code, adultery was a crime only against the husband. The present Code (Art.
241) speaks of "a married person who commits adultery" instead of "a married woman who commits
adultery" (former Code, Art. 183).
14 The Book of the (former) Han (Dynasty), the Annals of (the Emperor) Kao-(Tsu), Ballmore.
Waverly Press (1938), states at 58:
I am merely going to agree with you, Fathers and Elders, upon laws in three articles, he who
kills anyone will be put to death; he who wounds anyone or robs will be punished according tb
his offence.
Is Confucian Analects Book VIII, Chapter 9 (Chinese Classics 1, at 211).
"6 This is the reason for the small number of lawyers in relation to the total population in Korea
(about 600 lawyers in a population of 23,000,000).
17 See Articles 136 and 165, Korean Code.
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upon ordinary men." The Korean Code has incorporated the basic Confucian moral
conception of filial duty. Where a man kills, injures or harms his or his spouse's
lineal ascendant, the punishment is aggravated. 9 An individual may not lodge a
complaint against his or his spouse's lineal ascendant. 0
In addition, there may be found in the new code certain specifically Korean moral
notions. Thus, the element of evil "motive" renders an offense an aggravated crime.
Punishment for simple perjury is penal servitude for not more than five years, whereas
that for malicious perjury (for the purpose of causing injury to a person accused of
crime) is aggravated up to ten years (Art. 152). A similar gradation of punishment
applies to the crimes of suppression of evidence and of harboring (Art. 155).1 Moral
censure of falsehood is expressed in the differential treatment of defamation depend-
ing on whether it does or does not accord with truth. Subject to certain exceptions, a
public allegation of defamatory-even though true-facts is punishable by penal
servitude or imprisonment for not more than two years or fine not exceeding fifteen
hundred Hwan; in contrast, a mere public allegation of false facts is punished by
penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than five years or suspension of qualifi-
cations for not more than ten years (Articles 307, 310).2
II. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND THE GERMAN POINTS OF VIEW
Since the principal rules of the Korean Code are derived partly from American
and partly from German legal ideas, their exposition requires a preliminary presenta-
tion and critical comparison of the principles underlying the two systems, which
differ in philosophical outlook and political ideology.2
18 See Art. 135, Korean Code, which reads thus:
A public official who, taking advantage of his official authority, commits a crime other than
those described in this Chapter, shall be punished by increasing by one half the penalty specified
for the crime committed, except in those cases where the punishment was specially prescribed
in view of (the offender's) status as a public official.
It should be noted that abuse of authority is punishable separately (art. 123).
19 Where a man kills, injures, injures causing the death of, uses violence against, cruelly treats,
makes a false arrest of, makes a false arrest causing the death of, or intimidates, his or his spouse's
lineal ascendant, the punishment is aggravated. See Articles 250 II 257 1I, 258 I1, 259 II, 260 II,
273 II, 276 II, 277 II, 283 II, Korean Code.
20 Art. 224, Code of Criminal Procedure. The special provision of the German Code for patricide
has been repealed in 1941 (Sect. 215).
2 Compare Sections 257, 258, German Penal Code.
2 It should be noted that certain provisions of Korean law are due to the uncritical continuation
of policies introduced into Korea by the Japanese. Chapter 33 of the Korean Code on Crimes againts
Reputation (Articles 307 to 312) belongs to this category. The defense of truth to a charge of defa-
mation (Art. 310) is not available where the defamation has been committed in print or by radio
(Art. 309). This defense is essential to a "free man living in a free society" (LAssWEr.r., NATIONAL
SECtUTY AND IXDIVIMUAL FREEDOM, 1950, at 49), lest the country become a "garrison-police state."
2Judging in terms of historical development, one might say that the approach of the Anglo-
American law is realistic or inductive whereas that of the German law is idealistic or deductive. See
RoscoE PouND, SPIRIT OF THE Co.rmoN LAW (i921), 3, 156, 166 et seq.; ThE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
LAW, published by the School of Canon Law, the Catholic University of America (1946) at 15.
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1. IMENS REA
Both the Anglo-American and the German law have accepted the Roman law
maxim, A clus non facit reum nisi mens sit ?ea. However, the principle expressed in
this maxim developed differently in the two systems. The German law draws a sharp
distinction between Vorsatz (dolus, intent) and Fahrldssigkeit (culpa, negligence).
This distinction leaves no room for the intermediate concept of "recklessness" as
conceived by the Anglo-American law. The difference in approach may be best
illustrated by comparing two hypothetical situations viewed in the light of the two
systems. Under German law, a farmer who, in a state of high emotional tension,
after a quarrel with his wife, smokes in his barn filled with hay, thereby causing the
burning of the barn, will not be guilty of the crime of arson, if, although aware of
the danger, he hopes that the fire will not occur. By contrast, a servant who, in a
similar emotional state, after a quarrel with his master, causes the burning of the
latter's house by smoking, will be adjudged guilty of arson, if, while not desiring the
destruction of the house, accepts it in case it should occur. The theory underlying
the distinctive treatment of the two situations under German law is that there is a
difference in principle and not merely in degree between the state of mind of the
farmer and that of the servant in the described cases.2" The former is merely guilty
of advertent negligence (bewusste Fahrlssigkeit), whereas the latter is guilty of
dolus eventualis, which is an instance of intent.25 Under Anglo-American law both
situations would fall within the category of "recklessness." 6' 2 Similarly, homicide
under German law is sharply divided into two categories: intentional killing (com-
prising Mord and Totschlag, Sections 211 and 212 of the Penal Code) and negligent
24 The stated hypothetical cases are used as examples in MAX ERNST MAYER, DER ALLGEMEmNE
TEIL DES DEUTScHEN STRAFREcHIS (Sec. ed. 1923) at 264.
25 Dolus eventualis in German law is an instance of intent that may be present in any type of
intentional crime. In the cited example, however, there is in German law an additional element which
is absent in the common law concept; in the latter, a man cannot commit arson by burning his own
property (except in cases of burning for the purpose of collecting insurance, made criminal by special
statutes e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws, Chapt. 266, Sect. 10), whereas in the former arson can be committed
in this manner; for the purpose of punishing arson in German law is not protection of "the habitation
of individuals" but protection against public danger. And compare infra, note 26.
26 The German Criminal Code distinguishes between aggravated arson (Sect. 306, schwere Brand-
sliflung) and simple arson (Sect. 308, dnfadze Brandsliflung). The former applies where the object
consists of a building or other structure which is used as human habitation, whereas the latter applies
where the object consists of a building or thing which is not used as human habitation. In the latter
case (Sect. 308), the object is usually not the property of the accused. Setting fire to one's own prop-
erty is arson only where the fire is likely to spread to one of the premises enumerated in Section 306,
subsections 1 and 3, or one of the things above mentioned which belong to another person. The case
in the text falls within the latter part of Section 308.
2 G. WmLLAMS, CRunNAL LAw, THE GENERAL PART (1953) at 49. See also J. HALL, General
PRNcixs or CRnnaAL LAW (1947) at 217. According to common law principles, arson cannot
be committed by mere recklessness. Rex v. Faulkner [1876] 11 Ir. C. L. 8, 13 Cox 550. But see Model
Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, Sect. 2.02 (3), pp. 14, 127, 128.
28 Philologically, the German word "Mord" is derived from "Morth" (Latin murdrumn, French
inurdre) which meant secret homicide. See Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, vol. II, at
484. However, the Anglo-American conception of manslaughter does not fall within the category
of either the German Tofscidag (Sect. 212), which linguistically corresponds to "manslaughter," or
to the German falirldssig T61ung (Sect. 222), meaning "negligent homicide."
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killing (fahrldssige Tdfung, Section 222, id.). There is no concept corresponding
squarely to the general notion of manslaughter, as conceived by the Anglo-American
law.
As between these divergent points of view, the Korean legislator chose to follow
the German pattern (Arts. 13, 14, 250, 267, Korean Code).
a) CRIME OF NEGLIGENCE
In German law the principle prevails that where a statute declares conduct criminal
without specifying the required state of mind, it is assumed that intent is necessary,
whereas negligent conduct will constitute a crime only in those cases in which the
statute specifically proscribes negligence.Ya Article 14 of the Korean Code, which
basically adopted the German principle, provides that "Conduct in ignorance, due
to neglect of normal attention, of facts which are constitutive elements of a crime shall
be punishable only where prescribed by law." The code introduces five crimes of
negligence: 1. Setting fire by negligence (Arts. 170, 171); 2. inundation by negligence
(Art. 181); 3. obstruction of traffic by negligence (Art. 189); 4. bodily injury and
homicide by negligence (Arts. 266, 267, 268); 5. crimes concerning stolen property
committed by negligence (Art. 364). As may be seen, the crimes of negligence in
Korea are less numerous than in Germany, 9 but more numerous than in Anglo-
American law, in which the crime of negligence is a very exceptional phenomenon."
The Korean Code rather resembles the Anglo-American pattern in accepting certain
acts as criminal only if committed bygross negligence, in contrast to simple negligence.
Thus, the crimes of receiving stolen property are punishable only when committed
by gross negligence (or negligence in the conduct of a trade) (Art. 364). 31 In cases of
setting fire, obstructing traffic, bodily injury and homicide, due to gross negligence,
the punishment is aggravated.
b) MISTAKE OF FACT AND MISTAKE OF LAW
The traditional position, prevailing both in the Anglo-American legal system and in
the German law, as interpreted by the Reichsgericht, may be best expressed in terms
of the Latin maxim, Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia legis nominem excusat. 2 The
rule that it is no defense to a criminal charge that the accused did not know the law
which he has violated, has been variously justified. Justice Holmes advanced as its
basis the policy "to make men know and obey the law."," Austin pointed to the prac-
tical difficulty of proving ignorance of law.Y Judicially, it has been said in support of
28a But see Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, Sect. 2.02, pp. 12 seq.; 123 seq.
29 The German Code punishes negligence in supervising a minor (Sect. 139b), negligent perjury
(Sect. 163), committing an offense while drunk (Sect. 330a). The Korean Code contains no such
provisions.
10 See J. HALL, op. cit., at 233. Professor Hall insists that mere negligence should not be punishable.
31 Articles 364, 362, Korean Code.
2 The Anglo-.American law still adheres to this position. See Kenny, Outline of the Criminal Law,
16th ed., Sect. 39 (1952). See also Model Penal Code, Section 2.04 and Section 206.1, Tentative
Draft No. 4, at 17, and Tentative Draft No. 1, at 51 61 seq.
33 Ho.m s, CoMMoN LAW (1881) at 48, 49, 125.
14 AusTn, LEcn-REs ON JURISPRUDENCE (1911), vol. I, 481 e! seq.
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the doctrine that the law should be paramount and that its paramount validity
requires independence of subjective belief in its existence. 5
While the German Penal Code deals only with mistake of fact (Sect. 59) and does
not mention mistake of law, legal scholars have for many years advocated adoption
of mistake of law as a defense. Eventually, without a formal amendment of the code,
the defense was introduced into the law by way of judicial interpretation. The
Bundesgerihishof, in a historical decision rendered on March 18, 1952,16 held that
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act is part of criminal "guilt," so that where,
without fault on his part, the accused did not know the law which he violated, he is
fully excused, whereas in case his mistake was based on fault, the court may in its
discretion reduce the penalty. The rule that mistake of law constitutes a defense has
since become a settled principle of German law, and the controversy now centers
solely upon the question whether the theory of "guilt" accepted by the
Bundesgerichtshof should be replaced by the theory of "intent," according to which
mistake of law is assimilated to mistake of fact.Y In the latter view, advanced by
Mezger," unawareness that the act is wrongful eliminates intent, whereas a negligent
mistake of law renders the actor punishable for crime by negligence if negligent com-
mission constitutes a crime.
Under the Japanese occupation, the traditional view that a mistake of law is not
a defense was applied strictly. Even advice of counsel that the act was lawful afforded
no basis for an excuse. 9 The new Korean Code adopted the excuse of mistake of law,
however, not as at present formulated in German law, but rather as suggested by
M. E. Mayer.4 His view was that the possibility of knowledge of legal duty is a
constituent element of mens rea. In addition, the Korean Code formulated the test
of the excuse of error of law in objective terms. Article 16 of the Korean Code pro-
vides:
Where a person commits a crime in the belief that his conduct does not constitute a crime under
existing law, he shall not be punishable provided that his mistake is based on reasonable grounds
(adequate cause).
Under this provision, an unreasonable mistake of law affords no excuse whatever,
except in case of extenuating circumstances (Art. 53).
35 People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 P. 436 (1923).
36 Decision of the Great Senate for Criminal Matters of March 18, 1952 (2 B.G.H. St. 194). The
decision is hailed as one of the great events of legal history.
37 See Probleme der Strafrechtsreform, Deliberations of the Gross Strafrechtskommission, 4th
sesions, Febr. 1-4, 1955, Annex No. 76 to the Bundesanzeiger of April 21, 1955.
38 MZGER, Wand lngen der slrafrechilichtz Tatbeslandslelire, NEUE JuRIssscn- WocENKMscUmFr
1953, 2.
31 Decision of the Japanese Supreme Court of Sept. 28, 1934, 13 Han-Rei-Shu 1230.
40 M. E. MAYER, op. cit., at 322. The view of Mayer that punishment is predicated upon possi
bility rather than upon actuality of knowing the legal duty (Miglichkeit der Pflichterkenninis) is
again gaining ground in Germany. WELzEL, DAS DEuTscHE STRAYRECHT (4th ed., 1954, 121 et seq.)
and MAuRAcH, DEurscmms STRArREcHr (4th ed., 1954, at 410) have recently abandoned their
previous view that guilt requires an actual consciousness of illegality and adopted the position that
a "possibility of knowledge" that an act is wrongful should be sufficient.
19571
PAUL KICHYU RYU
C) FELONY-AIURDER, MISDEMEANOR-MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE-VERSARI IN RE
ILLICITA
The felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine of theAnglo-American
law and the corresponding doctrine of versari in re illicita of the continental European
law constitute the main exception to the requirement of mens rea. Their rationale in a
modern legal system being rather dubious, it may be instructive to speculate on their
historical origin and justification.
The Biblical theory of criminal responsibility proceeds from the idea of guilt (viens
rea).4' However, popular belief in the Middle Ages held the very appearance of guilt
as incompatible with performance of Church functions.42 Under its influence, there
developed the notion of irregularitas ex defectu famae or disqualification due to the
publicity (or the scandal) produced by the apparent commission of crime even though
none had been in fact committed.4 This notion, in turn, affected the medieval thinking
on criminal responsibility. Eventually, a compromise was reached in the canonical
doctrine of criminal law between this notion and the common tenet of Christian
morality and of Roman law that the exclusive determinant of guilt is the mental
attitude of the actor. This compromise was thus formulated by an eminent scholar:"
Irregularity attaches to every guilty homicide. However, guilt consists not only in dolus or cudpa
of the Roman law; rather, a homicide is also deemed to be due to guilt where the actor, about to
perform an illegal act, accidentally kills another. Tersanli in re illicila (opcram danli rei illicilae)
inpulantur onia qtae seqatntur ex delicto.
According to Loeffier, this doctrine was first formulated by Bernardus Papiensis
between 1191 and 1198. 4' It is highly probable that Bracton was acquainted with this
canonical view,4 6 and that his famous distinction between acts of killing depending
on "whether a person is employed upon a lawful or unlawful work"47 is traceable to
its influence. 48 It is hardly accidental that the principle of versari in re illicita is in
both the Canon and the Anglo-American law limited to the law of homicide. 49
11 An exemption is granted to the person who commits an actus reus without intent. Deuter. 19,
2-5. The Anglo-Saxon law used the device of royal pardon to adjust the principle of absolute re-
sponsibility to the requirement of moral guilt. Sayre, Mfens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 980 (1932).
42 LOEFFLER, DiE SCHULDORMEN DES STRAFRECHTS (1895) 138, 139. The following historical
account is based upon this study.
43 This explains the great significance attributed to "notoriety" of crime in the canon law. LOEF-
FLER, op. cit., note 9, at 139.
4 LOEFFLER, op. Cit., 139.
45 LOEFFLER, Op. cit., 139, 140.
IG On the influence of Roman and canonical doctrine on Bracton see POLLOCK and MAITLAND, Op.
cit., 475, 476; also STEPHEN, HISTORY OF TIE CRIMINAL LAW or ENGLAND, vol. III (1882) 32 et
seq.
47 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, Twiss ed., vol. II (1879) 277.
41 Of course, it has been argued that the felony-murder doctrine had its inception when all felonies
were punished capitally, so that it was a matter of indifference to an offender as to which he was
convicted of committing. See WIHARTON, TiE LAW or HomcmE, 3rd ed. (1907) 114, 147.
49 As to the Canon law see LOEFFLER, op. cit., 142. The scope of the doctrine has been restricted
in course of time. Originally it was understood that "if A meaning to steal a deer in the park of B,
shooteth at the deer and by the glance of the arrow killed a boy that is hidden in a bush, this is
[Vol. 48
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It is generally accepted in continental European legal theory that the "crimes
determined by result" (Erfolgsdelikte) and the "crimes aggravated by the result"
(erfolgsqualifizierte Delikte) originated in the Canon law doctrine of versari in re illicita.
Since in modem law all crimes are determined by some result, there is no reason to
dwell upon the former concept of crime." Only the latter concept presents a serious
issue. In German law, in contrast to the Canon law and the Anglo-American law, the
notion of crime aggravated by a result whose gravity is not traceable to the guilt
of the actor was extended to offenses other than homicide; namely, cases involving
bodily injuiy. However, vigorous criticism by German commentators of the idea
underlying all crimes of versari in re illicita led to a significant amendment (August
25, 1953) of the German Penal Code which reads thus:
Where the law attaches a higher penalty to a special consequence of the act, such higher penalty
shall not be imposed upon the actor unless he caused the consequence at least negligently. 51
Under the old Korean law-the Japanese law-the idea of "crimes aggravated by
the result" extended beyond its scope within theframework of theformer German law.
It comprised not only cases involving bodily injury, but also cases of unlawful con-
duct resulting in the spreadingof fire to structuresY- Furthermore, the courts held that
where A instigates B to inflict a bodily injury upon C and that injury accidentally
results in C's death, A is guilty of instigating the crime of aggravated bodily injury. 3
The rationale of these holdings was that the idea of crime aggravated by the result
applies to the instigator as well as to the principal actor, so long as there is approxi-
mate causal relationship between the latter's conduct and the aggravated result. Actu-
ally, these rules constituted an exception from the principle of mens rea.
The new Korean Code preserved the broad view of crime aggravated by the result
in its Japanese version. At the same time, however, it adopted the idea of the German
amendment of August 25, 1953. Article 15 II of the Korean Code reads as follows:
murder, for the act was unlawful, although A had no intent to hurt the boy and know not of him."
Coke, 3rd Institute, at 56. Later, the "unlawful act" required as a basis of felony-murder was only
a felony. On the other hand, the same doctrine was applied to the area of misdemeanor with a fatal
result, and thus the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine came into being. Where a man slapped
the face of another who turned out to be a hemophiliac and who died in consequence of the assault
he was held guilty of manslaughter, although he did not know that the deceased was a hemophiliac.
State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W. 2d 707 (1936).
-0 The Nazis tried, but failed, to substitute for the "crimes determined by result" "crimes based
upon intent." (On this see infra, Section II, 2, b).
5t This amendment added Section 56 of the Penal Code (text of September 1, 1953, B.G.B1. pt.
I, at 1083).
=Section 111 of the Japanese Code, which reads as follows:
When, as a result of the commission of the crime described in paragraph 1 of Article 109 (set-
ting fire to structures other than dwellings owned by the offender) or paragraph 2 of the preceding
Article (setting fire to object other than structures owned by the offender), a fire spreads to aid
bums any of the objects mentioned in Article 108 (setting fire to dwellings) or paragraph 1 of
Article 109 (setting fire to structures other than dwellings), imprisonment at forced labor for
not more than three years shall be imposed.
w See decision of the Japanese Supreme Court of October 22, 1931, 470 Kei-Ji-Han-Rei-Shu 10.
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Where a more severe punishment is imposed upon a crime because of certain results, such higher
punishment shall not be applied if these results were not foreseeable.
It follows that in the above described case, A would now be responsible for instigating
an aggravated bodily injury only if, at the time when he instigated B to inflict a
bodily injury upon C, the latter's death was foreseeable.
2. Acrus REUS
a) ACTUS REUS BY OMISSION
Criminal conduct normally consists of a positive act. Occasionally, however, it
consists of an omission, that is, of a failure to act where there is a legal duty to do so.
The extent to which positive duties to act should be imposed by law is the subject of
vigorous ideological controversy. The political philosophy of "laissez-faire" which
generally advocates a minimum of restraint of an individual's freedom of action
places an increased emphasis upon his freedom not to act if he so chooses. A socially
oriented political philosophy, on the other hand, tends to impose upon the individual
a maximum of social responsibility for the welfare of others: this implies broad duties
of positive action.54 The varieties of views lying between the one and, the other ex-
treme are exemplified by the manner in which the moral idea of the "Good Samaritan"
is reflected in the Anglo-American, the French and the German law. In the United
States, the duty to assist another is primarily conceived as a civil law concept.5" Nor
does failure to assist necessarily constitute a tort.56 However, assistance in certain
cases has been considered conduct which may properly be expected and, therefore,
will not be deemed an unnecessary assumption of risk which would afford a defense
to a tort action. 7 Certainly, violation of the moral duty of brotherly assistance does
not carry a criminal sanction."' The French Penal Code (Art. 63 (2)) imposes a
punishment of three months to five years and a fine of 24,000 to 1,000,000 francs
(or either punishment) upon a person who "voluntarily abstains from rendering
assistance to a person in peril, if he could render it, either by personal action or by
summoning help, without risk to himself or others."59 In Germany, the Nazis intro-
duced a broad duty of assistance in accordance with their idea of the total social
integration of the individual. Failure of an individual to assist "in case of an accident
or common danger or emergency, although, according to the people's sound sentiment,
5 An ideal "Free Society" should be neither purely individualistic nor exclusively socially oriented.
Discussion of the features characterizing such society exceeds the scope of the present paper.
11 HOLsES, op. cit., at 278.
16 E. CAHN, THE MORAL DEcisioN (1955) 190, 191.
57 CAHN, op. cit., 183-184.
58 See "The Failure to rescue; A comparative study," Note, 52 COL. L. REv. 631 (1952).
59 Art. 63(2), enacted by Ordinance No. 45-1391 of June 25, 1945, concerning the citizens' assist-
ance in the administration of justice and in public security (JoUR-xNL OFFIcIEL, June 26, 1945, p.
3862), as amended by Law No. 54-411 of April 13, 1954, regarding the punishment of felonies and
misdemeanors committed against children (JouRN.L OrFIcYEL, April 14, 1954. p. 3580).
The new Yugoslav Penal Code of 1951 (Art. 147) imposes imprisonment for not more than one
year upon anyone who "fails to offer help to a person exposed to immediate danger of life, although
he was able to do so without any danger to himself or any other person." See Do-,,Ea The New
Yugoslav Criminal Code, 61 YALE L. J. 510 (1952).
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he has a duty to render assistance," was rendered punishable by imprisonment up to
two years or by a fine.0 After World War II, this rule (Sect. 330c) was alleged to have
been invalidated by the provisions of the Control Council Proclamation No. 3, abol-
ishing legislation which reflected specific Nazi ideologies. The broadness of the con-
cept of "sound popular sentiment" used as a standard of duty, lending itself to
arbitrary use of discretion, was, of course, a typical Nazi feature. An amendment of
the provision finally did away with its objectionable parts, at the same time pre-
serving the basic idea of duty to render assistance sanctioned by criminal law. The
pertinent section now reads:"
Whoever fails to render assistance in case of accidents or common danger or emergency, even
though such assistance was required and he could be expected to render it under the circumstances,
particularly without considerable danger to himself and without violating other important duties,
shall be punished by imprisonment up to one year or by fine.
The courts have since interpreted the section broadly by extending the term "acci-
dent" to events not clearly within its linguistic scope.6
The Korean Code introduced a number of positive duties of action: nonperform-
ance of a munition contract in war-time, of a contract with the government for the
supply of necessities of life, refusal to leave another's habitation, 3 etc., were placed
under criminal sanction. However, the Code did not adopt a "Good Samaritan law".
Nor does it punish, except to a very limited extent, failure to assist the police, dis-
obedience to lawful orders, or misprision.6 '
The above described instances of crime by omission consisted in failure to act in
violation of a specific statutory duty. Such omissions are referred to in German doc-
trine as "crimes by genuine omission" (echtes Unterlaussungsdelikt).6 ' They corre-
spond in Anglo-American law to the category of crime by "non-feasance". 6 With
these may be contrasted the so-called "crimes by pseudo-omission" (unechles Unler-
lassungsdelikt), or "omission in the narrower sense" within the meaning of Anglo-
American law. The latter consist in failing to avert a result, where such failure is
deemed equivalent to bringing about such result. Duty to act in these cases is not
specifically placed under criminal sanction. But most crimes which are normally com-
&0 Section 9 of Law of June 28, 1935 (R.G.Bl. pt. I at 833).
61 Amendment of August 3, 1953 (B.G.Bl. pt. I at 735).
"On this see H. SrvNG, Euthanasia; A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. or PA. L.
REv. 350, note 94 at 373 (1954). Also compare with regard to Art. 63 of the French Penal Code the
interesting decision of the Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.) of June 23, 1955, reported in Recueils
Dalloz et Sirey, 1955, Jurisprudence 575.
-Articles 103, 117, 319 II, Korean Code.
G The Korean Code punishes some instance of non-feasance as mere violations. See A.L.I. Model
Penal Code, Sect. 1.04 (5) for definition of the term "violation."
65 Anglo-American scholars do not distinguish omission from non-feasance. See J. HALL, op. cit..
at 250; compare G. WrmUAms, op. cit., at 4, stating: "The legal duty to act ... must be positively
laid down by the law."
66Kircheimer's distinction of "direct omissions" and "indirect omissions" (see Criminal Omnis-
sions, 55 HAv. L. Rxv. 615, 1942) is rather vague. The distinction suggested by German scholars
of "genuine omission" and "pseudo-omission" is commendable. "Pseudo-omission" is conceived as
a positive act, although, in fact, it consists in non-action. The distinction might be best expressed in
English by use of the term "omission," as contrasted with "non-feasance."
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mitted by a positive act can be also committed by failure to act. For example, a
mother can murder her infant child by failing to rescue it when it is about to drown,
as well as by a positive act of drowning it.Y In instances of this nature, however, there
must be present, in addition to the mere fact that the proscribed result would not
have occurred but for the failure to act (causation), a duty to act. Here, in contrast
to cases of crimes by genuine omission, the scope of duty whose violation may render
a defendant responsible for a criminal result is not circumscribed by criminal law.
It may accordingly vary in different legal systems and at different times. There is a
general tendency toward increase of the range of such positive duties. Thus, in the
early German law the crime of pseudo-omission was held to lie only where a duty to
act was imposed by statute, customary law or contract, or where the defendant had
himself created certain factual circumstances which called for further action. It was
held not to lie where the duty was based merely upon principles of good faith (gute
Sillen). On February 13, 1936, however, the Reichsgerichts overruled these holdings
and decided that where defendants had passed bills of exchange without disclosing
the fact, known to them, that the transactions underlying the drawing of these bills
were sham and that the acceptors were insolvent, they were guilty of criminal fraud
in failing to observe the principles of good faith and fair dealings between contract-
ing parties.69 In a similar situation in English law, failure to disclose pertinent fact
was held not to constitute a crime,7" "because it is only an inconvenience and injury
to a private person." In a Massachusetts case,' however, the court upheld a direction
to the jury that if a fire had accidentally started on the defandant's premises and he
intentionally refrained from extinguishing it in order that the premises might be
destroyed and that he might recover the insurance, he was guilty of arson," just as
much as if he had started the fire.
The Korean law, under the Japanese occupation, developed in a similar direction.
Where defendant sold his property without disclosing the fact that it was mortgaged
and took the full price from the purchaser, the Supreme Court of Japan held his
silence to constitute criminal fraud. 73 Finally, the new Korean Code introduced an
express provision dealing with crime by pseudo-omission:
A person who, having a duty to prevent danger from arising or, having brought about jeopardy
by his own act, does not prevent danger from arising shall be punished for the results of such danger.
(Art. 18)
This provision consists of two parts. The first merely states in general terms that a
person violating his duty to prevent danger is responsible for its results. It does not
state upon what conditions the duty to prevent danger depends. This is left to judicial
6
7
MAURACH, DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT (AUgemeiner Teil) (1954) 231-247.
6 Decision of Febr. 13, 1936, R.G.St. 70, 151 (II Strafsenat. Urt. v. 13 Febr. 1936, g. v. W. u. a.).
69 Sect. 263, German Civil Code.
70 Court of King's Bench (1761) 2 Burr. 1125, 97 Engl. Rep. 746.
71 Commonwealll v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 141 N.E. 510 (1923).
72 Burning one's own house for the purpose of collecting insurance, not a crime at Common Law,
has been made a crime by special statute in Massachusetts. MAss. GENq. LAWS, Chap. 266, Sect. 10.
718 Han-Rei-Shu 107, March 7, 1929.
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interpretation. The courts have formulated three grounds upon which the duty to
prevent danger is based: statute or customary law, contract, and principles of good
faith and public policy. It is believed that the third mentioned source should be in-
voked only in extreme cases, such as the Massachusetts case, in which the defendant's
omission can be interpreted as actus reus, but not in other cases such as the Japanese
case, which reflects a rather far-reaching socially oriented view of criminal respon-
sibility. 4 The policy of the second part of the provision is very dubious. That part
suggests that the mere creation of jeopardy renders a defendant who fails to prevent
its results as responsible as if he had brought them about. Thus, in a case similar to
that of People v. Goodman,75 where defendant, having occasioned the victim's jump-
ing from his running car, failed to stop and rescue her, as a consequence of which she
died, he would be guilty of murder by omission rather than of manslaughter. By way
of general criticism of the entire provision, it may be added that the distinction it
assumes between a "positive" and a "negative" act is not satisfactory. The difference
between such acts is actually a relative one. Every actus reus can be committed by
an omission as well as by an act. It is only that proof of intent may be easier to
adduce from an act than an omission.
b) compzicrry
The German concept of "parties to a crime" differs widely from the corresponding
Anglo-American concept. Parties are classified into three categories: co-principals,
instigators and aiders, the latter two being also treated as a comprehensive group
and contrasted with co-principals. Only those whose activities are antecedent to or
coincide with the commission of the crimes are regarded as "parties", whereas the
activities of these who, in Anglo-American law, would qualify as "accessories after
the fact" constitute an independent crime ("Harboring a criminal," Sect. 257 of
German Penal Code). Where two or more persons agree to commit a crime, they may
be co-principals (Sect. 47) or aiders (Sect. 49) depending on the degree of their par-
ticipation in the crime. Participation in the actus reus qualifies as co-principal,
whereas mere assistance characterizes the aider. The latter is punishable in accord-
ance with the standard applicable to the principal, but his punishment may be re-
duced in the Judge's discretion (Sect. 44). Instigation consists in inciting another to
commit a crime. It is distinguishable from "spiritual aiding" (intellektuelle Beihilfe).
76
Instigation, by its very nature, precedes the commissionof the crime, and thus cannot
be said to constitute a part of the actus reusY But it is deemed so dangerous as to
justify punishment "in accordance with the law applicable to the act which (the
defendant) has knowingly instigated." (Sect. 49 (2)).
The crime of "solicitation", which is an extension of the idea of instigation, plays
7'4 It is highly dubious that the Model Code's recommendation that certain types of omission be
made crimes accords with the traditional Anglo-American concept of criminal law. See Model Code
Tentative Draft No. 2, 65 et seq.
75 182 Misc. 585, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 715 (Supr. Court, Spec. Term, Sullivan County, 1943).
76 M. E. MAYER, op. cit., 397.
77 In this sense, instigation is sharply distinguishable from the Anglo-American notion of "ac- "
cessory before the fact."
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an important role in German penal law.78 Its historical development is worth restating,
for it reflects an ideological evolution pervading the entire theory of criminal law.79
At the time of the enactment of the German Penal Code, the prevailing theory was
the objective view of the actus reus. Where instigation was unsuccessful, that is, in
the case of a mere solicitation, no punishment would lie, for no crime was objectively
present, to which the act of solicitation could be attached. Gradually, this theory
yielded ground to the so-called subjective theory of the actus reus. This theory, in
substance, corresponds to the "positivist" or socially-oriented view. In its light, the
actus reus is no more than a symptom of the dangerous, anti-social personality of the
actor. Where stress is laid on the personality of the actor rather than on the objective
aspect of criminal conduct, instigation, reflecting reprehensible character traits, is
itself, in a sense, an actus reus. Hence, solicitation which, in effect, constitutes an
attempted instigation is deemed a crime. The crime of solicitation was first introduced
into the German law in 1876 by insertion in the Penal Code of Section 49a.8° This
original version of Section 49a largely resembles the rule on solicitation as known in
the Anglo-American law. In the Nazi-inspired German legislation the crime of solici-
tation acquired unprecedented dimensions. The aim of the National Socialists, ex-
pressed in the National Socialist Memorandum on Criminal Law of the Prussian
Ministry of Justice, was to substitute for the traditional concept of "criminal law
based on the injury done" (Verletzungsstrafrecht) the concept of "criminal law based
on danger" to the blood community of the German People (Gefdlrdungsstrafrecht).
They believed that danger lies in the criminal intent, and they accordingly proceeded
from the theory of "crime based on intent" (Willensstrafrecht).u The object of crim-
inal law, in their view, was to punish that dangerous intent. Thus, under the Nazi
regime Section 49a was reformulated as follows.s
Whoever solicits another to commit a felony or to participate in a felony shall be punished as an
instigator even if the crime was not carried out or was carried out independently of the solicitation.
The punishment may be reduced...
78 Theoretically, mere "solicitation" cannot constitute an azcus reus, for the latter, under the
legality principle, usually consists in express action rather than in a mere expression of thought.
For this reason, "solicitation" may be understood only in terms of an extended criminality of in-
stigation.
71 MAURACH, op. Cil. (1954) 562.
80 Sect. 49a reads thus:
Whoever solicits another to commit a felony or to participate in a felony and whoever accepts
such solicitation shall be, unless the law provides for another penalty, punished by imprisonment
for not less than three months if the solicited felony is punishable by death or confinement for
life in a penitentiary; but if the solicited felony is punishable by a lighter punishment, he shall
be punished in a fortress for the same period.
81 Nalionalsozialistiszes StrafreIt, Denkschrift des Preussischen Jvrizminisfers (1933) 112. The
"danger-principle" (Gefdihrdungsprinzip) means that a dangerous act should be punishable even
if it does not result in any actual harm. The traditional view of criminal law predicates punishment
upon the occurrence of a harmful result. In adopting the theory of danger, the Nazis took an extreme
subjective view of the criminal act.
12 As amended May 29, 1943, (R. G. B1. Pt. 1 at 339).
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This Section, reflecting an extreme subjectivist position, was severely criticized after
the collapse of the Nazi regime as violating the democratic idea of the rule of law.8
3
In 1953, Section 49a was accordingly amended to read as follows.
(1) Whoever attempts to induce another to commit an act which the law punishes as a felony
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions applicable to the attempt of such felony.
Other change introduced into the law of complicity in crime under the Nazi regime
but not connected with ideological considerations were retained after its collapse.
They are adoption of the Anglo-American conception of conspiracy and repudiation
of the ancillary nature of complicity. The first mentioned change consisted in the
insertion in the Criminal Code of Section 49a(2).
The same punishment shall be applied to the person who enters into an agreement to commit an
act which the law punishes as a felony, or accepts the offer of another to commit such act or declares
readiness to commit a felony-
The second change consisted in rendering punishment of the accomplice independent
of whether or not the principal is punishable (Sect. 48).
The New Korean Code adopted largely-though by no means fully-the ideas of
the German Code of the pre-Nazi era. 8 The Korean provision, while deviating from
its German pattern, conforms to it in an important respect: both impose a lighter
punishment upon solicitation than upon attempt.
With regard to aiders, the Code provides (Art. 32(2)):
The punishment of aiders shall be less severe than that imposed upon principals.
It should be noted that the concept of "accessory" in Korean law is wider than the
corresponding Anglo-American concept. It includes a person who, under American
law, would qualify as principal in the second degree.
Significantly, in contrast to other codes, the Korean Code contains an express
provision dealing with crime committed by an "innocent agent." It is further inter-
esting to note the nature of this provision. The punishment for such crime is the same
as that imposed upon instigating and aiding. Article 34(1) provides:
13 The punishment which the judge was authorized to mete out was clearly excessive; mere so-
licitation of murder could be punished as severely as the completed crime. The discretion granted
to the judge was extremely wide; it ranged from punishment for murder to complete remission of
punishment.
81 Text of Sect. 1, 1953 (B. G. BI. pt. 1 et 1083).
85 See supra, note 78.
16 Article 31 reads as follows.'
(1) Whoever instigates another to commit a crime is subject to the same punishment as is
applicable to the person who actually commits the crime.
(2) Where a person instigates, another to commit a crime and the latter consents thereto but
does not reach the commencement stage of its commission, the instigator and the person who has
been instigated shall be subject to punishment as applicable to conspiracies and preparations.
(3) The preceding section shall apply to the instigator even though the person whom he in-
stigated does not consent to the commission of a crime.
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A person who commits a crime by instigating or aiding another who is not punishable for such
conduct or who is punishable as a negligent offender shall be punished in accordance with the pro-
vision for an instigator or an aider.
In most laws, in cases of crime by an innocent agent the instigator is punished as a
principal. The Korean view is thus rather restrictive. By contrast, an outright socially
oriented view is adopted in Article 34(2) which provides:
A person who causes the results described in the preceding section by instigating or aiding another
person who is under his control and supervision shall be punished by increasing by one half the
maximum term or maximum amount of penalty provided for the principal in the case of instigation,
and by ihe full penalty provided for the principal in the case of aiding.
With group offenses the Code deals expressly, in providing specifically for the
severe punishment of ring leaders in cases of insurrection (Art. 87), and in creating
a new crime of "organization of a criminal group" (Art. 114). However, these offenses
do not properly fall within the framework of the general part of the Code regarding
complicity. They are crimes in which participation of several people is an essential
part of the actus reus, as defined by statute, and thus constitute instances of so-called
"'necessary complicity" (notwendige Teilnahme).
3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Many, though by no means all, provisions of the criminal law reflect the political
ideology of the nation within which they developed, and it is indeed desirable that
the entire body of such law be based on a sound and consistent political philosophy.
To crystallize a philosophy that could serve as a basis for the future reform of Korean
law, it may be useful to compare the Anglo-American traditional philosophy with
the German, as they appear in particular provisions. For the Korean legislation was
not the result of considered autonomous planning, but a compilation of divergent
views, among which the German views predominated. A future reform will have to
make an intelligent choice of a point of view rather than of specific solutions. Roughly,
the Anglo-American traditional idea may be said to give effect to a maximum of
individual freedom as against the State, whereas the German idea has been rather
oriented to protection of State interests.
a) FORMAL CRIMES AND MATERIAL CRIMES
In Germany crimes have been classified into formal crimes (Formaddeikle) and
material crimes (Materialddikte). In formal crimes the aclus reus does not include
any element of injury, whereas in material crimes some injury to an interest pro-
tected by law is an essential part of the crime. An instance of the former category
may be the German crime of perjury, which is punishable regardless of whether or
not the false testimony is material. An example of the latter is murder, in which the
death of a person is an essential part of the definition. The very fact that the de-
scribed distinction developed in German law expresses recognition of the existence of
crime without injury to anyone. M. E. Mayer criticized this distinction by pointing
out that it is a fallacy to believe that a formal crime has no result whereas a material
8' M. E. MAYER, op. cit., 85 el seq.
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crime has a result. This idea results from confusion of chronological with logical
coincidence.IS 18I. E. Mayer's criticism, while logically correct, confuses the legal with
the sociological definition of crime. The fact is that the distinction is a valid one but
that it is not inherent in the nature of a particular crime to be a crime in form only
or a crime of substance. Rather, the question whether a crime should be formulated
as the one or as the other depends upon policy considerations.8S These considerations
should also prevail with regard to the Anglo-American concept of perjury, which has
been criticized by Stephen for taking materiality into account.90 91
b) ENTRAPmENT
Where a crime is committed or attempted at the instigation or with the cooperation
of government agents, the liberal position is that the accused can set up the defense
of "entrapment" against the criminal charge. The Anglo-American law which as-
sumes this position, indeed, goes one step further in affording the accused, in addition,
also the defense of consent by the injured party wherever such consent would nor-
mally constitute an excuse. The defense of entrapment is available only where the
accused did not intend to commit the crime except by virtue of government induce-
ment,w the theory being that-as a requirement of "the highest public policy"-the
government is estopped from prosecuting where it had itself induced the commission
of the crime. "Public policy" here means "a body of principles within the common
law" representing the ethos of the community.93
In contrast, in countries of continental Europe the defense of entrapment is un-
known. Indeed, the principal concern of these countries in dealing with the problem
of the "agent provocateur" or "Lockspitzel" has been not the defense of the entrapped
person but the punishment of the entrapper. The French position particularly is that
the latter commits a technical crime of instigation and is not punished only for want
of prosecution. In Germany, the prevailing view is rather that the government agent
88 According to MAYER, op. cit., at 119, it is fallacious to say that perjury, for example, has no
results.
89 The practical importance of the distinction lies solely in the area of causation.
S STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRnINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, vol. III (1882) 240-250.
It may be necessary to give a wide interpretation to the word "material," but whether materi-
ality is to bz entirely eliminated as a constituent element of perjury in the Anglo-American law is to
be determined in terms of policy. Although the purpose of punishing perjury is protection of the
judicial function, it is to be considered whether it would serve the criminal function of guaranteeing
individual freedom to punish a person even where there is no possibility of infringement upon the
judicial function at all. In addition, the Anglo-American law does not recognize the crime of negli-
gent perjury, as known to the German law.
91 Another classification, namely, that into crimes of risk (Gefdhrdungsdelikle) and crimes of injury
(Verlezungsddikte) may also be shown to be ultimately based on policy considerations. It is inter-
esting to note that there was a tendency, during the Japanese occupation in Korea, to interpret
provisions as crimes of risk rather than as crimes of injury. For example, the crime of obstruction
of business has been interpreted as crime of risk, requiring no infliction of real harm. See 19 Kei-Ji-
Han-Rei-Shu 85.
mSorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Compare CLARK and MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES
(1952) 215 e seq.
13 DENNis LLOYD, Law and Public Policy, 8 Current Legal Problems 42 (1955).
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does not actually "intend" the crime to be committed.94 As to the victim of the en-
trapment, French courts occasionally hold him to be excused on the theory that he
acted under an irresistible compulsion exercised by the government agent (French
Penal Code, Art. 64). 95 In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof96 recently held that where
a police woman placed her purse upon her shopping bag in a department store in
order to entrap the accused and the latter took the purse, she was guilty of attempted
larceny rather than of the completed crime, since she never acquired full control over
the purse, the police being at all times capable of withdrawing it from her.9" The
court rejected the accused's argument that the police woman had "consented" to
the taking, on the ground that the accused was not aware of such consent."
After World War II, the Anglo-American theory of entrapment had promptly been
adopted by the Japanese lower courts.99 The accused sold opium to a police officer
upon the latter's instigation and in ignorance of his status. The court acquitted the
accused on the ground that he had been entrapped. Later, however, the Japanese
Supreme Court' 0 overruled this theory which had often been followed by the lower
courts.
The Korean Code contains no provision dealing with entrapment. Nor has the
problem arisen before courts. There are two possibilities under Korean law of recog-
nizing the significance of entrapment. Article 20 of the Criminal Code condemning
acts which are contra bonos mores may be used as a basis for setting up the defense of
entrapment, or the defense may be based on purely procedural grounds.' 0'
C) WITHDRAWAL FROMX CRIME AND SELF-DENUNCIATION; CRIME UPON COMPLAINT
While generally tending to applying criminal sanctions sparingly, so as to safe-
guard a maximum of individual freedom, the Anglo-American law in some instances
admits punishment where the continental European law grants immunity or a re-
duction of penalty. Such extensive application of criminal sanctions in this country
is the result of the jurisprudential view that criminal law has an objective quality or,
as is sometimes said, that the law is paramount.
The objective view of criminal law is expressed in the non-recognition of with-
91 MAURACH, op. cit., at 551.
95 This assumes that the agent does more than is comprised in mere complicity, within the mean-
ing of Art. 60, Penal Code. Art. 64 assumes that the action of the accused is no longer "free." Don-
nedieu de Vabres, Trait6 de droit criminel et de legislation p6nale comparge (1947), 75, 76, 216.
96 Decision of April 30, 1953, 4 B.G.H.St. 199.
9- In contrast to the Anglo-American law, in which a slight movement of the object is sufficient
to constitute an asportation (see English case of Regina v. Simpson, 1854, 1 Dears 421), the German
law requires for the consummation of larceny of complete establishment of control over the prop-
erty.
98 Compare with this case Jarrolt v. Stale, 108 Tex. Cr. App. 427, 1 S.W. 2 619 (1927), rehear.
den. (1928).
99 Yokohama District Court decision of June 19, 1951.
100 7 Sai-ko-Sai-ban-Sho-Han-Rei-Shu 482 (1953).
101 As suggested by Justice Roberts in the Sorrells case (supra), it would be wiser simply to quash
the indictment in such a case. In any event, the defense of entrapment should be purely personal
to the person who has been entrapped. It should not be available to an accessory who has not been
entrapped by the Government agent.
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drawal from crime and self-denunciation as a mitigating factor, on the one hand, and
of crime upon complaint, on the other.
Voluntary desistence from crime is not a ground for mitigating punishment in the
Anglo-American law" '-%. Thus, "if a man resolves on a criminal enterprise, and proceeds
so far in it that his act amounts to an indictable attempt, it does not cease to be such,
though he voluntarily abandons the evil purpose."'0" Of course, a more liberal tend-
dency may be reflected in sentencing policies. By contrast, the German law foregoes
punishment of attempt entirely in cases of abandonment of a criminal intention and
prevention of the injurious result (Sect. 46 of German Penal Code).
The Korean Code adopts an intermediary solution in providing for mitigation or
remission of punishment in cases of desistence from a criminal conduct or of preven-
tion of its completion (Art. 26). With regard to self-denunciation, the Code adopts
an extremely flexible attitude. It provides in Article 52:
(1) When self-denunciation is made to competent authorities which have the responsibility to
investigate the commission of crime, the punishment may be mitigated or remitted.
(2) The preceding section shall apply when voluntary confession is made to the injured party in
cases of crimes which cannot be prosecuted over the objection of the victim.
In addition, with regard to certain specific crimes, the Code provides for mandatory
mitigation or remission of punishment in cases of self-denunciation or voluntary
confession.0 '
In contrast to the American law, both the German and the French laws recognize
initiation of criminal proceedings by parties injured by the commission of a crime.1'4
The reasons for admitting the principle of private complaint are protection of the vic-
tim's interest and in case of minor offenses the consideration that prosecution may
not be desirable except where the victim demands it.
The Korean Code recognizes numerous instances of crime upon complaint: crimes
concerning foreign relations (Art. 110); crimes of violence (Art. 260 111); bodily
injury through negligence (Art. 266 11); crimes of intimidation (Art. 283 111); kid-
napping (Art. 296); rape (Art. 306); defamation (Art. 312); violation of secrecy (Art.
318); property crimes between relatives (Arts. 32811; 334; 354; 361; 365). In addition,
the Code introduced the idea of crime which "cannot be prosecuted over the express
objection" of the victim (Arts. 110; 260111; 26611; 283111; 312).105
4. PsycuIAm AND CR m mAL LAv
The basic distinction between the traditional Anglo-American test of insanity and
the German test, as prevailing since 1933,106 lies in the fact that the former defines
O1a But see the recent case, people v. Hacht, 283 p 2nd. 764 (1955).
ln Glover v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 382, 10 S.E. 420 (1889), at 386.
10o This applies to cases of insurrection (Art. 90(1)), treason (Art. 101), crimes concerning foreign
relations (Art. 111 II), crimes concerning explosives (Art. 120(1)), perjury (Art. 153), false accu-
sation (Art. 157), arson (Art. 175), crimes concerning currency (Art. 213).
10 In practice, the same result may be reached in the Anglo-American law. Note the rare instances
of indictment of adultery in New York State.
105 Art. 110; consent of victim in crimes concerning foreign relations; Art. 260 111: consent of
victim in the crime of violence; Art. 283 111: consent of victim in the crime of intimidation; Art.
312: consent of victim in the crime of defamation.
106 Sect. 51, Penal Code, as amended Nov. 24, 1933 (R. G. BI. pt. I at 995).
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insanity in purely cognitive terms, whereas the latter also introduces volitional ele-
ments into its definition.
The McNaghten rules define insanity as "a defect of reason from disease of the
mind," resulting in the accused's not knowing the nature or quality of the act or its
wrongfulness. A further possibility of defense is afforded by the "partial delusion"
rule, which is but a special instance of the rule concerning mistake of fact. In some
states of the United States, the volitional aspect of insanity has been given some
effect in the "irresistible impulse" test.
In Germany, the source of irresponsibility is formulated broadly: it may be an
"impairment of consciousness," a "pathological mental derangement" or a "mental
infirmity". The incapacity resulting from any of these sources may be the actor's
cognitive inability to realize the wrongfulness of his conduct or his volitional inability
to act in accordance with such realization (Sect. 51).
In the United States, the Durham case" 7 has recently introduced a revolutionary
change. This case describes the source of incapacity as "mental disease or mental
defect" and the inability itself, excluding responsibility, as simply "the product of
mental disease or mental defect." 0 9
The Korean Code does not strictly follow any of the stated patterns. It provides
in Article 10(1) as follows:
(1) A person is not punishable if, because of mental disorder, he is unable to pass rational judg-
ments or to control his will.
As may be seen, incapacity, excluding penalty, is, as in the German law, either
cognitive or volitional. However, the cognitive incapacity is described broadly. It
consists not merely in the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong, but generally
in the incapacity to pass rational judgments. Nor is the inability directed to the par-
ticular act in issue; it is rather an inability to evaluate generally. While there is no
objection to assuming a broad concept of cognitive incapacity, the same cannot be
said of the breadth of scope of volitional incapacity; for inability "to control one's
will", in contrast to the inability to evaluate, is a matter which cannot be determined
without psychiatric knowledge and a clear understanding of the meaning of punish-
ment. Here, it is important that the lawyer receive a proper psychiatric guidance,
based on sound psychiatric principles, as well as a legislative guidance based on a
proper philosophy of punishment. It is also imaginable that a man may possess no
volitional capacity with regard to one crime but possess such capacity with regard to
the crime of which he stands indicted.'
Regarding "partial responsibility" as a basis for a reduction of punishment, the
German law recognizes diminished responsibility in cases where the cognitive or
volitional capacity of the actor is diminished due to the enumerated causes (Sect.
51(2)). The punishment in such cases may be reduced, in the judge's discretion, in
accordance with the provisions on attempted crime. Persons who have committed a
107 Durhamn v. United States, 214 F 2d 962 (App. D. C., 1954).
106 See Insanity and the Criminal Law, A crilique of Durham %,. United Slates, Symposium, 22 U.
of CHICAGo L. REv. 317 (1955).
109 The Model Code rejects the "product test" adopted in Durham v. United States and, in addi-
tion, in Paragraph (2) of Section 4.01, excludes from the concept of "mental disease or defect" the
case of the so-called "psychopathic personality". See Tentative Draft No. 4, at 156-160.
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crime in a state of diminished responsibility are, if public safety requires, committed
by the court to an institution for cure and treatment and such commitment is ordered
in addition to the punishment (Section 42b). This German solution is the result of a
practical compromise between two opposing historical penal philosophies, the classic
retributory theory of punishment and the positivistic reformative theory. The
former requires that in the case of a person whose cognitive or volitional capacity is
diminished the punishment should be reduced, whereas the latter insists that such a
person is more dangerous to society than a normal person and that consequently his
punishment* should be increased. 10
By contrast, the conception of partial responsibility has been rejected both in the
British Commonwealth 1' and in most American jurisdictions." 2 This writer believes
that the Anglo-American careful approach to this problem is commendable. The
scope of punishment must be judged comprehensively on the basis of a sound theory
applicable to the entire field of criminal law rather than resolved in a piecemeal
maner. A simple provision for reduction of penalty in cases of diminished responsi-
bility tends to oversimplify this important basic issue of criminal legislation.
The uncritical reception by the Korean Code of the continental European concept
of diminished responsibility is regrettable. The Code provides (Art. 10(2)):
Where, due to mental disorder, a person is deficient in the powers mentioned in the preceding
section, the punishment shall be mitigated.
It is hoped that a future revision of the Code will reexamine this provision and con-
sider the question of diminished responsibility in contact with the fundamental
problem of responsibility in general.
CONCLUSION
In the present paper an attempt has been made to present certain fundamental
rules of the New Korean Code, as they emerge from conflicting ideologies, without
seeking to fully answer each problem. Although the discussion has been necessarily
cursory, it is hoped that it has succeeded in conveying to the reader a basic belief
of the writer; namely, that not only criminal legislation but also interpretation of
criminal law must develop from a clear understanding of two basic elements of crimi-
nal law, crime and punishment, which is to be derived from a sound democratic
philosophy. This is an age when scientific (and ethical) knowledge should be applied
to the construction of legal machinery for the realization of the higher value of human
dignity, which is a basic requirement of "free society" The criminal law must be not
a conglomeration of unrelated rules but a product of a considerable "World-view", 13
integrating science and ethics."4
' 0 SALEILIES, INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (Jastrow transl., 1911) 56 et seq.
" Except murder case in Scotland. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953)
Report, Cmd. 8932 (1953) at 131, 413.
' Fisher v. United States, 80 App. D. C. 96, 149 F 2d 28 (1945), affd., 328 U. S. 463 (1946). Fdr
comment see KEEDY, A problenm of First Degree Murder: Fisher v. U. S., 99 U. or PENNA. L. REV.
267 (1950).
113 1 use the term "world view" to translate the term Weltanschauung. See A. SCEWEIZER, THE
PHmIosoPEY or CIVILIZATION XVII (translator's note) (1953).
M If we negate the ethical experience, "there is no possibility of holding our world back from the
ruin and disintegration toward which it is being hastened." ScHWEIzER, op. cit., at XV.
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